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Kazakhstan’s continuing socioeconomic and political 
stability, a formal commitment to political reforms and 
an unambiguously pro-Western orientation make it the 
EU’s most reliable partner in the Central Asian region. 
Its rising oil exports – almost 80% of EU imports from 
Kazakhstan consist of fuel – and geostrategic location 
make a close and continuing partnership with the EU 
inevitable. Recognising that Kazakhstan is favourably 
placed to be the foremost player in the region, this 
analysis advocates that the EU should 1) develop an 
internally-differentiated strategy towards Central Asia 
with Kazakhstan as a strategic anchor in the region, 
and 2) prioritise the promotion of democratic reforms 
and transparency of political and economic processes 
which can turn Kazakhstan into a more effective and 
reliable partner of the EU and a positive engine for 
reform in the broader region. 
Kazakhstan’s economy has grown from $18 billion in 
2000 to nearly $80 billion in 2007 and is predicted to 
double in the next 7-8 years. Having already achieved 
recognition by the EU and the US Department of 
Commerce as a country with a market economy, 
Kazakhstan aspires to be among the top 50 most 
competitive economies in the world within the next 
decade. Already, its GDP accounts for almost two-
thirds of the combined GDP of Central Asian states. 
Thus the gap between its economy and that of its 
neighbours is increasing rapidly. 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev has cultivated a vision 
of Kazakhstan as a prosperous and stable country that 
is set to achieve the economic success of Kuwait, and 
the social harmony, political stability and development 
levels of Western societies. This promise of stability 
and prosperity, guided by the economic success 
delivered by its rich oil and mineral resource base, has 
enabled Nazarbaev’s regime to garner considerable 
domestic support and legitimacy. Although 
Kazakhstan’s ruling elites have shown a greater 
responsiveness to both domestic and international 
public opinion, they have yet to demonstrate a full-
fledged commitment to building an open, democratic 
polity. 
While Kazakhstan is undoubtedly ahead of other 
Central Asian states in combining relative political 
freedom with socio-economic well-being, its multi-
party system and legal-institutional framework are 
designed to enhance presidential authority and 
perpetuate the present political establishment. Having 
already expressed his eagerness to stand for the next 
presidential elections (scheduled in 2012), Nazarbaev 
has not established any mechanisms for the transfer of 
power or succession. The President’s eldest daughter 
Dariga Nazarbaeva and her husband Rakhat Aliev, on 
the one hand, and the second son-in-law Timur 
Kulibaev, on the other, are often looked upon as 
harbouring the ambition and resources to succeed 
Nazarbaev. At the same time, members of the 
presidential inner circle such as Kasymzhomart 
Tokaev and Marat Tazhin, who have demonstrated 
unswerving loyalty to the regime and have powerful 
reputations for their technocratic prowess, are likely to 
play a decisive role in a battle for succession. Tokaev, 
a Sinologist who has previously held the posts of 
Ambassador to China, Minister of External Affairs and 
Prime Minister, currently holds the crucial post of 
Chairman of the Senate, which has the constitutional 
authority to assume power in the event of death or 
incapacitation of the president. Having headed the 
National Security Service in the past, Tazhin now 
holds the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
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Overall, members of the inner circle in a post-
Nazarbaev Kazakhstan are likely to pursue the present 
economic policies and maintain the multi-vectoral 
policy geared at balancing the West, Russia, China and 
the neighbouring Muslim world. Under the present 
regime, the ability of electoral reforms and the new 
post-Soviet institutions to facilitate open electoral 
competition and encourage political participation from 
below is limited. None of the presidential or 
parliamentary elections held in Kazakhstan so far has 
been recognised as ‘free and fair’ or meeting 
international standards.  
Kazakhstan’s relative economic well-being and socio-
political stability can be attributed to two main factors: 
1) its enormous oil and natural gas reserves, combined 
with mineral wealth, which have attracted some $34 
billion in foreign direct investment since 1991; and 2) 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s skilled disbursement 
of this wealth and political power to crucial societal 
strata through the use of patronage and balancing of 
clan and ethnicity-based attachments.  
Increasing oil exports and high global oil prices have 
propelled Kazakhstan’s economic growth of over 8% 
annually since 1998. Oil revenues accounted for at 
least two-thirds of the country’s budgetary revenues in 
2006, increasing its GDP to $5,100 from $3,620 in 
2005. As Kazakhstan aspires to rank among the top 
five oil exporters by the year 2015, oil will account for 
over three-fourths of its budgetary revenues. The 
reserves in the National Oil Fund, which was created 
in 2000 to cushion the economy from fluctuating 
global oil prices, had grown to $12 billion by the end 
of 2006. Possessing the most dynamic banking sector 
after Russia, Kazakhstan is also a frontrunner in 
developing a vibrant telecommunications sector.  
Having held the top leadership position since 1989 
under Soviet rule, Nazarbaev has displayed 
considerable political acumen in steering his country 
towards economic transition to establish a modern, 
competitive, market-oriented economy. While showing 
remarkable pragmatism and flexibility in responding to 
new challenges, he has also skilfully improvised upon 
Soviet-era mechanisms of coercion and control for 
extracting the compliance of the citizenry to his 
particular form of rule. Nazarbaev has erected a 
patronage-based system in which the inner circle of 
close family, friends and business associates exerts 
formal and informal influence over vital economic 
resources, industries and political positions. The inner 
circle of the presidential family has bought off 
numerous privatised media channels and occupies vital 
political positions in the government. At the same 
time, Nazarbaev has continued to broaden and 
regenerate his clientelist base, offering rapid career 
mobility to technocratic elites and top level 
government bureaucrats. Political loyalty to the regime 
is the best means of attaining career mobility whereas 
pursuit of independent political ambition invites severe 
sanctions. It is virtually impossible for a political party 
or an individual to acquire a major political position 
without joining pro-regime parties or pledging 
personal loyalty to the regime. Critics of the 
government and opposition have little prospect of 
launching an independent political career.  
Internal political structure and stability 
Kazakhstan’s 1995 constitution and subsequent 
amendments have vested unlimited constitutional and 
de facto powers upon the office of the president in 
what already was a unitary, highly-centralised 
presidential system. Subsequent constitutional 
amendments have conferred immunity from 
prosecution to the ‘First President’ and will allow him 
to play an advisory role upon quitting office. The 
prime minister, who is appointed by the president, is a 
technical functionary entrusted with implementing 
socio-economic policies and delivering results without 
challenging the authority of the president. The 
presidential administration, which is an extra-
constitutional structure beyond the purview of the 
parliament, exerts considerable power and influence, 
whereas the Council of Ministers headed by the prime 
minister forms the second, and subordinate, flank of 
the executive.  
A notable development since 2004 is the emergence of 
a third centre of power in the growing influence of 
Kazakhstan’s Security Council.
1 Currently headed by 
Berik Imashev, the Security Council has acquired a 
leading role in coordinating the activities of the law 
and order authorities, formally under the control of the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs, thus eroding the authority 
of the prime minister. While remaining fully under the 
control of Nazarbaev, the Security Council is 
becoming a battleground of competing groups vying 
for influence. The pivotal role played by the security 
services in Turkmenistan in guiding the accession of 
Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov to the presidency 
after Saparmurat Niyazov’s death suggests that 
Kazakhstan’s Security Council is likewise well-
positioned to exert an independent influence in the 
post-Nazarbaev era. 
The appointment of 41-year old Karim Masimov, an 
ethnic Uighur, fluent in English, Chinese and Arabic in 
addition to Russian, as prime minister earlier this year 
has brought several reform-oriented technocrats within 
the cabinet and led to significant changes within the 
government.
2 Daniyar Akhmetov, who held the post 
earlier, now heads the Ministry of Defence. Tokaev, 
now occupies the pivotal post of Chairman of the 
Senate. The post was previously held by Nurtai 
Abykaev, a kin of Nazarbaev and widely seen as a 
‘grey cardinal’, who is now ambassador to Russia. 
Abykaev’s temporary exit from the domestic scene 
may be geared at protecting him from rumours about 
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his alleged complicity in the killing of Altynbek 
Sarsenbaev, a leader of the opposition party Nagyz Ak 
Zhol, in February 2006. A number of former 
employees of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the 
Security Council, some of whom were closely 
associated with Abykaev, have been convicted in the 
Sarsenbaev murder case.
3 Past trends indicate that the 
key figures within the inner circle have easily re-
entered domestic politics after having held vital 
diplomatic posts abroad. 
The attention of Kazakhstan’s political establishment 
is now turned to preparing for the next (2008) 
parliamentary elections. The presidential party Otan 
has refashioned itself into an enlarged entity Nur Otan 
by securing a merger with the Asar party, which was 
established by Nazarbaev’s eldest daughter Dariga 
Nazarbaeva, also an MP and a media tycoon,, and the 
Civil Party of Kazakhstan. The latter, led by Azat 
Peruashev, is the political wing of the business 
conglomerate Eurasia Group headed by Alexander 
Mashkevich, Patokh Shodiev and Alizhan Ibragimov, 
which is estimated to produce about 15% of the GDP 
of Kazakhstan. These pro-regime parties are fully in 
control of the parliament which is bereft of any 
genuinely independent members. The moderate Ak 
Zhol led by Alikhan Baimenov holds the sole 
‘opposition’ seat in the parliament and has offered a 
constructive partnership with the government. 
Opposition parties Alga, Nagyz (‘Real’) Ak Zhol and 
the new party Atameken founded in late 2006, which 
is widely seen as supported by the president’s second 
son-in-law Timur Kulibaev and has not yet declared 
itself in opposition to the government, have been 
battling to obtain registration. 
Foreign relations and oil export routes 
Kazakhstan has done well to use its geographical 
location, vast territorial expanse and the need for 
multiple outlets for oil exports to follow what it terms 
a ‘multi-vectoral’ foreign policy. Rather than attaching 
priority to a single country, its foreign policy is geared 
at developing close partnerships with all of its 
neighbours and an active engagement in multilateral 
regional organisations, particularly the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SC), the Eurasian Economic Community 
(Eurasec) and the EU. This approach has allowed 
Kazakhstanto deepen its already close ties with Russia, 
expand economic, political and strategic cooperation 
with China, develop growing ties with the European 
Union and procure support of the US. In what is an 
important rhetorical affirmation of the close ties with 
Russia and the commitment to the CIS, Nazarbaev has 
also called for establishing a Eurasian Economic 
Union on the model of the EU. Outlining Kazakhstan’s 
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new military doctrine, its Defence Minister Daniyal 
Akhmetov acknowledged that participation in the 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and 
military cooperation with its member states is a 
priority for Kazakhstan. As a key member of CSTO 
after Russia, Kazakhstan sees itself as better-placed to 
gradually build a further partnership with NATO and 
the US. While its relationship with Russia and key role 
in the CSTO is the primary source of security and 
diplomatic leverage, Kazakhstan’s political elite is 
eager to push for a closer collaboration with NATO 
and the US, particularly through participation in peace 
support operations. 
Without a doubt, Kazakhstan needs a close and 
preferential partnership with Russia to increase its oil 
exports, and thereby build a stronger economic base. 
At the same time, President Nazarbaev is also looking 
to diversify the country’s energy export routes. At 
present, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) route 
passing through Russia is the largest export route for 
transporting oil from Kazakhstan. Although the current 
capacity of the CPC route (28 million tonnes in 2005) 
is to increase to about 67 million tonnes within a few 
years, which will allow Kazakhstan to transport this oil 
further to Europe with Russia’s consent, Kazakhstan is 
seeking further oil export routes that complement, 
rather than compete with the routes offered by Russia. 
Russia, however, has sought to channel the main 
Central Asian energy export routes across its territory. 
In May 2007, President Putin persuaded Kazakhstan 
together with Turkmenistan to back Moscow’s plan to 
build a gas pipeline to bring gas from the two Central 
Asian countries along the Caspian shore and into 
Russia – rather than across the Caspian and the South 
Caucasus, the route favoured by the EU and the United 
States. 
China has also sought access to Kazakhstan’s energy 
resources. A 1000 km-long pipeline linking Atasu in 
central Kazakhstan to Alashankou on the Chinese 
border is to be operational by mid-2008 and will 
provide a new source of oil for China to develop its 
western Xinjiang region. Although further expansion 
of this route is planned, the high transportation costs 
make the economic benefits of the pipeline to 
Kazakhstan uncertain. The route currently has greater 
political than economic significance for Kazakhstan. 
Issues such as oil export routes and energy security are 
vital for the EU. Kazakhstan is the EU’s biggest 
trading partner in Central Asia, with bilateral trade 
worth over €15 billion. About 85% of Kazakhstan’s 
exports to the EU consist of oil and gas. Should the 
EU’s relationship with Russia be transformed and 
result in a much closer economic and strategic 
partnership, Kazakhstan’s partnership with the EU and 
participation in many of its programmes could be 
enhanced further. 
Nazarbaev has already indicated a willingness to 
consider any pipeline routes that could be “profitable 
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and not a competitor with Russia in seeking to 
diversify its export routes. A continuing EU 
engagement can enable Kazakhstan to become more 
closely involved in extending the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline and possibly use its close ties with 
Russia to assuage the latter’s discontentment over the 
route. 
Furthermore, closer cooperation between Kazakhstan 
and the EU is crucial in aiding the development of the 
Trans-Caspian-Trans-Black Sea energy transit corridor 
and for the Odessa-Brody pipeline. By aiding a 
diversification of oil export routes, the EU is keen to 
ensure a secure supply of oil and help Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to obtain higher export 
prices – notably for gas exports – and establish a 
stronger position vis-à-vis Russia. Kazakhstan has 
been steadily increasing its investment in Georgia, 
particularly in the transportation infrastructure, 
becoming the third major investor after the UK and the 
US. As a result, it is in a position to play an important 
role in achieving the EU’s aims in the south Caucasus 
through its investment in the economies of the region.
 4 
Given the widespread agreement within the EU to 
support these pipeline routes and enhance energy 
security, there are three vital issues that the EU must 
address in expanding energy cooperation with 
Kazakhstan: 
•  Ensuring transparent management of revenues 
from oil and gas and to cooperate closely with 
international efforts such as the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI).  
•  Implementing comprehensive policy measures for 
an equitable distribution of wealth and social 
welfare. Although poverty levels are declining, an 
estimated 16-18% of the population, a vast 
proportion of which resides in remote rural areas, 
lives below the poverty line.  
•  Development of grassroots institutions for civic 
participation and lifting various legal barriers that 
restrict basic civil rights to public assembly and to 
participation in electoral contests. This will help to 
rectify the emphasis of the regime on promoting 
‘democratisation from above’. 
New EU strategy for Central Asia 
As the EU seeks to develop a coherent though 
internally-differentiated strategy towards its recent 
members, it must also be mindful of the shared 
historical experience of the Central Asian people as 
well as the significant variation in socio-economic 
development, reform-orientation and state capacity 
among them. Kazakhstan has shown a keen interest to 
participate in the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), a privileged relationship between the EU and 
all its current non-member states that are not members 
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or potential members. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 
European Commissioner for External Relations and 
European Neighbourhood Policy, emphasised 
developing a more differentiated approach by the EU 
and establishing unique relationship towards each of 
the Central Asian states.
5 
Kazakhstan has continued to emphasise its ‘Eurasian’ 
status, underscoring its geographical, historical, ethno-
cultural ties with Europe and the desire to play a 
prominent role in the Western club of nations on the 
basis of its enormous size and economic potential. 
Although pragmatic considerations push the present 
Kazakh leadership to maintain a balance between 
Russia, China and the West, a growing stratum of its 
elites, educated in the West, are fully cognizant of the 
advantages to be attained from a close and growing 
multilateral partnership with Europe. They see Europe 
as providing vital technical assistance in modernising 
Kazakhstan’s educational, health and social 
infrastructure, in addition to reforming its economy. 
In the present context, Kazakhstan is the obvious 
candidate for regional leadership and the most reliable 
partner for the EU in the region. This is because 
Uzbekistan, a powerful contender for regional 
leadership, has failed to utilise its enormous potential 
despite possessing the most diversified economic 
infrastructure and human capital. The utter failure of 
President Islam Karimov to undertake reforms has 
generated a systemic socioeconomic crisis that the 
regime is tackling through an alarming use of 
repression since the killings in Andijan in May 2005. 
This turns Uzbekistan into the gravest long-term threat 
to stability in the region. Succession in Uzbekistan is 
unlikely to be as smooth as in Turkmenistan, which 
appears to be taking incremental measures to engage 
with the outside world and extricate itself from the 
personality cult of Niyazov. While committed to 
establishing relatively open political systems, both 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are weak states with poor 
governance capacity, dependent on donor support. 
However, the EU must not succumb to the facile 
reasoning that Kazakhstan is far ‘better’, and ‘more 
democratic’ than the rest in the region seen as lacking 
structural and cultural conditions to build democratic 
institutions and processes. Such a view can easily lapse 
into condoning the Kazakhstani regime’s formalistic 
and instrumental pledge to political reforms and 
reinforcing its fixation with ‘stability’. As a fast 
expanding economy with a GDP that is currently 
almost two-thirds that of the entire Central Asian 
region, Kazakhstan’s record in promoting democracy 
and human development needs to be assessed in 
comparison with other post-communist states that have 
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a comparable success in establishing market 
economies and aiding privatisation. While sensitivity 
to the cultural and historical legacy of the region – 
notably the impact of the Soviet years – is necessary, 
‘culture’ should not be viewed as a static variable 
hampering democratic development. The powerful 
resistance within Kazakhstan to creating an open 
media and competitive political system comes from 
groups and interests within the present regime who 
rose to power during the Soviet period by actively 
working within the coercive communist party 
apparatus against pro-reform forces. In this way, these 
strata of ruling elites have been the architects of the 
new post-Soviet authoritarianism rather than hapless 
recipients of a Soviet authoritarian legacy. 
Kazakhstan’s candidacy for the OSCE 
Chair and commitment to political 
reforms 
Kazakhstan’s political elites were fully aware of the 
need to ensure that the presidential election of 2005 
met the basic international standard as spelled out by 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) to boost their candidacy for the 
chairmanship of the OSCE for 2009. Although there 
were no significant technical or procedural violations 
during the 2005 presidential elections, the entire 
administrative and propaganda machinery worked 
together to favour the incumbent and discredit the 
opponents.
6 Nazarbaev secured another 7-year term by 
garnering 91% of the vote, an outcome that would be 
considered implausible and even illegitimate in a 
democratic or democratising country. This has earned 
him the nickname of ‘Mr 91 percent’ among his critics 
who warn about the impending ‘100 percent’ scenario 
in the next (2012) presidential elections. Aged 67 and 
in good health, Nazarbaev has given no indication of 
preparing any successor and indicated his willingness 
to run for the next (2012) presidential elections.  
Attaining the OSCE chair in 2009 and gaining a visible 
niche within the European framework is primarily a 
matter of status and prestige for the Nazarbaev regime, 
which is keen to boost its visibility and legitimacy in 
Western circles. Kazakhstan is spending enormous 
resources and efforts on PR activities to promote a 
positive image in Western media by touting its 
economic achievements and the dizzying construction 
in Astana. After initially becoming incensed over the 
blockbuster movie Borat, the Kazakh political 
establishment quickly learnt lessons and sought to reap 
benefits from the publicity aroused by the blockbuster. 
Furthermore, obtaining the OSCE chair for 2009 is 
also a matter of the personal reputation of Rakhat 
Aliev whose future political prospects are closely 
linked with whether Kazakhstan manages to hold a 
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leadership position within a European organisation. 
Aliev was reappointed Kazakhstan’s ambassador to 
Austria in January 2007 (a position he held from 2001 
to mid-2005 before becoming the First Deputy 
Minister of External Affairs) in order to intensify 
lobbying for the 2009 OSCE chair. 
A decision on Kazakhstan’s candidacy for the 2009 
OSCE chair is expected in the latter half of 2007. The 
US has made its support to Kazakhstan contingent on 
establishing proper democratic institutions. The Chair 
of the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee 
Joseph Biden expressed dissatisfaction with 
Kazakhstan’s lack of progress in moving towards 
democracy and emphasised that Kazakhstan must be 
“part of the solution, [and] not part of the problem”.
7 
While a more realistic option appears to be to consider 
Kazakhstan’s candidacy for the year 2011, it is still 
likely that Kazakhstan may get the 2009 chair to avoid 
the current diplomatic impasse. Several states 
supporting its candidacy justify this as a means of 
attaining a closer cooperation with the former Soviet 
states and as a further inducement as well as lever for 
pushing for political reforms. If this were to happen, 
Kazakhstan is likely to hail this as a vital recognition 
of the success of economic and political reforms, as an 
affirmation of its centrality in the region and as an 
opportunity to push for cooperation in energy, 
economic and security issues over democratisation and 
humanitarian agenda. Thus a rift between the security 
and human dimension objectives (democracy and 
human rights) of the OSCE has the potential of 
undermining the EU’s objective of balancing trade and 
economic interests with democratisation. 
Russia has criticised the OSCE for shifting between its 
‘security’ and ‘democratisation’ agenda, noting the 
prime purpose of the organisation is security. 
Kazakhstan shares this ‘traditional’ conception of the 
OSCE and notes that it has proved to be a crucial axis 
of stability and security in the region, and has taken 
steady steps towards building democratic institutions. 
In other words, it has made a significant contribution 
towards the three crucial objectives emphasised by the 
OSCE. 
Can the Kazakh political elite reconcile 
the practice of democracy with its 
vision of prosperity? 
Nazarbaev and his associates aver that democracy can 
emerge only on the back of economic prosperity and 
social stability. The Kazakhstani political 
establishment sees the promotion of democratisation 
and civil society as the imposition of a Western 
ideological agenda which is fraught with negative and 
destabilising consequences. The state-regulated media 
skilfully portray the ‘colour revolutions’ in the near 
abroad as a popular outpouring against economic 
discontent and which has only exacerbated 
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lawlessness. Such propaganda has had a considerable 
effect in inoculating the ordinary people ‘against 
political change’ to support ‘stability’ and in equating 
democracy with social unrest and Western propaganda. 
Voicing its commitment to establish a ‘responsible’ 
civil society, Kazakhstan’s ruling elites have used 
economic carrots, political control and electoral 
mandates to pressure non-governmental organisations 
and independent political parties to forge a 
‘constructive partnership’ with the government. At the 
same time, NGOs engaged in advocacy of civil rights 
and political reforms remain dependent on foreign 
donors and their activities have come under continuing 
surveillance through financial audits and other forms 
of control. Much of Kazakhstan’s much-acclaimed 
social and ethnic stability is achieved by curtailing 
civil and political rights and rewarding a culture of 
civic apathy and political disengagement. 
So far the Nazarbaev leadership has opted 
incrementally to allow ‘democratisation from above’ 
by overseeing the emergence of a multi-party system, 
regulating electoral competition, and attempting to 
create a structure of NGOs and civil society that is 
loyal to the regime. The state-appointed Commission 
on Democratisation and Civil Society devotes itself to 
this task. The reforms proposed by the regime in 
response to the mounting pressure from the OSCE, 
particularly the US, offer a mere tinkering of the 
present system to build a more visible façade of 
democracy. The government tends to indicate its desire 
and commitment to political reforms in the presence of 
leading international actors, but often fails to follow it 
up with appropriate legislation and implementation. 
Just a few days before the high profile annual meeting 
of Eurasian Media Forum in 2007 organised by Dariga 
Nazarbaeva, a new, more liberal draft media law was 
introduced in the parliament.
8 Though the draft media 
law eases restrictions on freedom of information and 
media registration, it retains the provisions that 
prosecute journalists for writing articles that 
undermine “the honour and dignity of the president”. 
The OSCE, and leading international media watchdogs 
such as Freedom House have called for the abolition of 
this particular clause.  
Nazarbaev has hinted at the possibility of transforming 
the present system into a parliamentary democracy and 
of establishing a 50% quota for political parties on the 
basis of proportional representation. The new system, 
or similar proposals, if adopted, would still allow 
Nazarbaev to recast himself as prime minister at a 
future date and, thereby, retain full power. 
Notwithstanding the incremental promotion of 
democratisation from above, it is vital to note that 
neither the regime, nor international actors can fashion 
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the development of democracy and civil society in the 
desired direction. The Kazakhstani ruling elites’ 
support to democratisation may be largely instrumental 
and self-serving, but it still provides an opening for 
long-term processes conducive to political 
liberalisation, transparency and civic participation. In 
Kazakhstan’s visibility within the OSCE and EU, 
Kazakhstan’s civil rights activists see a space for the 
pursuit of democratisation agenda, although they do 
caution that this will not inevitably follow. There is a 
widespread view among them that an outright denial 
would deprive the Kazakhstani political establishment 
of any vital incentive to promote further reforms. 
Conclusion: Long-term prospects for 
reforms 
Despite the numerous shortcomings of its political 
system, Kazakhstan possesses the various supporting 
conditions for achieving a transition to democracy in 
the long run. This is because the establishment of a 
competitive, market economy has unleashed several 
processes that indicate a long-term trend towards 
democratisation. Among the most significant of these 
are the emergence of a private and competitive 
educational system, the rise of an upper middle class, 
the introduction of a legal-institutional infrastructure in 
which multi-party elections take place and finally, a 
strong desire among the political elite and the educated 
citizenry to be part of a ‘European’ framework. These 
resonate with the vision outlined in the ‘European 
Education Initiative’ in the draft EU Strategy on 
Central Asia. (At the same time, the rapid emergence 
of a market economy has generated stark economic 
disparities and weakened the social safety network, as 
it has enhanced the ability of the regime to use 
patronage and sanctions to subordinate private 
business. Markets have not produced an independent 
entrepreneurial class or facilitated the expansion of a 
middle class that can press for political and economic 
reforms to limit the role of the state. On the contrary, 
business interests and entrepreneurs remain dependent 
on governmental patronage and goodwill. 
When the development of institutions of political 
representation and civil participation do not keep pace 
with the rapid rise in oil-based revenues, it becomes 
ever more challenging to establish rule of law, 
accountability and transparency. The EU must develop 
a nuanced approach in urging compliance with these 
recommendations, offer sustained support to building 
mechanisms of transparency and accountability in 
political processes and financial dealings and renounce 
the cliché of the ‘preservation of stability’ so beloved 
by the ruling group in Kazakhstan. It must ensure that 
the desire to secure further cooperation in the energy 
sector does not derail pursuit of its fundamental aims.  
The German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
has offered a ‘Central Asia Initiative’ to bundle 
together EU security and energy interests in the region, 
but such a strategy cannot be de-linked from an overall The EU and Kazakhstan | 7 
emphasis on political reforms and transparency.
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According priority to energy and security interests 
over democracy and institution-building is harmful in 
the longer run. Cultivation of close cooperation in 
energy and economic issues without a simultaneous 
emphasis on pursuing political reforms, combating 
corruption and encouraging civic participation will be 
detrimental to both EU and to Kazakhstani citizenry in 
the longer run. In an absence of a democratic 
framework, such cooperation can only aid technocratic 
purposes, benefit the top strata of society and produce 
a new class of professional technocrats interested in 
perpetuating rather than reforming the present system. 
Together with the OSCE, the EU must emphasise the 
urgency for Kazakhstan to launch, ahead of the 
decision on Kazakhstan’s bid to chair the OSCE, a set 
of comprehensive democratic reforms that can provide 
the basis for a sustainable process of political reform in 
the country. This emphasis offers incentive and hope 
to the pro-reform elite within the government, civil 
rights NGOs as well as the growing middle class to 
press for political reforms in order to be more closely 
tied with Europe. 
Recommendations to the EU 
The following recommendations identify a set of 
reforms that the EU should seek to promote in 
Kazakhstan through its engagement with a dialogue 
focused on developing concrete ways to implement 
such reforms. 
•  Lift constraints on the civil right to public assembly. 
Kazakhstan must scrap the numerous legal 
restrictions on freedom of assembly. Under current 
provisions, prior permission from the Ministry of the 
Interior is required in order to organise any public 
meeting. Existing laws and informal actions prevent 
opposition and civil society groups from holding a 
public meeting in any of the central areas of the 
major cities. The planning of the new capital Astana 
especially allows the government to control public 
space and make it logistically difficult for citizens to 
organise public meetings in any of the central areas.  
•  Allow registration to opposition and independent 
political parties. It is vital to introduce the necessary 
amendments to the laws on the registration of 
political parties during this year, in order to facilitate 
the registration of the Alga, Nagyz Ak Zhol, 
Atameken parties and other prospective parties so 
that they can prepare for the next parliamentary 
elections scheduled in 2008.  
•  Amend the election law and end the persecution of 
opposition leaders. Kazakhstan’s election law 
contains a clause that bars a person convicted of an 
administrative offence from contesting elections. For 
example, Bulat Abilov, a prominent leader of Nagyz 
Ak Zhol, is facing a string of politically-motivated 
charges of economic misdemeanour, some of which 
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have been upheld by the courts, in turn disqualifying 
him from standing for any public office. 
Kazakhstan’s judiciary has not issued a single 
verdict in the past decade that acquitted members of 
the opposition or independent journalists in respect 
to charges brought against them by individuals 
affiliated with the regime. The EU and OSCE must 
exert pressure on the government to end the 
persecution of members of the opposition, 
particularly of Bulat Abilov who is being 
investigated for politically-motivated charges of 
corruption and misappropriation of funds. 
•  Ensure independence and impartiality of the Central 
Election Commission (CEC). Under the present 
system, the presidential administration maintains 
complete control over the appointment of the CEC. 
The latter in turn has an uncontested mandate to 
appoint lower-level election commissioners. This 
system rests on patronage and has allowed the 
regime to successfully utilise the so-called 
‘administrative resources’ in order to produce a 
desirable electoral outcome. The Election 
Commission is fully loyal to the president who 
handpicks its members. Orderly organisation of 
elections and successful delivery of expected results 
have opened up further career paths for the chairman 
and other members of the CEC. The EU, together 
with the OSCE, must press for reforms that limit the 
power of the president to appoint members of the 
CEC and regional and district and local election 
commissions and allow an effective say to non-
governmental organisations and non-governmental 
figures. 
•  Ensure independence of the media. Kazakhstan’s 
media is privately-owned but controlled almost 
entirely by major financial groups affiliated with key 
members of the regime and the major pro-regime 
political parties. Kazakhstan must repeal its 
draconian media law which currently makes it 
impossible for banned news outlets to re-register or 
for a banned journalist to be absorbed in the existing 
media channels. The clause about protecting the 
“honour and dignity of the president” as well as anti-
terrorism legislation are widely used to restrict basic 
media freedoms. Kazakhstan has been forced to 
offer a measured response to the widespread 
international attention and negative publicity it has 
received due to its handling of the satirical film 
Borat. 
•  Ensure independence of the judiciary. Under the 
country’s strong executive system based on 
presidential patronage, the judiciary, like the 
legislative branch, has remained loyal to the regime. 
The judiciary has continued to protect the interests 
of the state and its functionaries rather than those of 
individuals, minorities and the weaker strata of 
society. Despite notable improvement in wages and 
professional training for judges, Kazakhstan’s 
judiciary has a very poor record in handling cases 
related to civil liberties and human rights. 